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Abstract
We document empirical life cycle profiles of wages, earnings, and hours of work for pay from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, following the same workers for up to four decades. For
six of the eight cohorts we analyze the wage profile does not decline with age (not before 65,
at least), while the earnings profile always does. The discrepancy is explained by a sharp drop
in the hours of work for pay profile beginning shortly after age 50, when many workers start a
smooth transition into retirement by working progressively fewer hours. This pattern is not an
artifact of staggered abrupt retirement, and is robust to attrition and selection-correction (i.e.,
taking into account that the composition of our sample, for a given cohort, changes over time).
We explore the nontrivial restrictions on dynamic models of the aggregate economy that this
evidence suggests, and we provide numerical profiles that can be readily used in quantitative
macroeconomic analysis.
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1 Introduction
This paper is an empirical investigation into life cycle profiles of wages (hourly compensation of
labor), hours (work for pay supplied to the labor market), and earnings (the product of the two),
from the vantage point of four-decades-long panel data. Theoretical and empirical investigation of
such profiles has a long tradition in labor economics and macroeconomics, because of their im-
portance in understanding a variety of phenomena such as labor supply, retirement, the allocation
of time, incentive contracts, training and human capital, saving, and inequality. The Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) now covers more than 40 years and spans nearly the entire working
lives of the cohorts that entered the labor market at the end of the 1960s, as well as substantial parts
of the working lives of younger cohorts. We use these data to estimate life cycle profiles that are
straightforward to interpret and that can be readily used in quantitative macroeconomic analysis.
We then use these profiles to explore the restrictions the data impose on a benchmark life cycle
model.
We find that wages typically do not fall (if they fall at all) until individuals are well into their
60’s, in line with some previous empirical research. However, hours fall substantially (and so do
earnings) beginning shortly after age 50. The drop in hours is generated by a smooth transition into
retirement, in the form of less overtime work and passage from full- to part-time. Although not
documented in a systematic way, Mincer (1974) had inferred this pattern from census data decades
ago. Analyzing these data, Mincer observed that the weekly wage rate was not declining at the end
of working life while annual earnings were. He wrote: “There is no visible decline at these later
ages in weekly earnings. Apparently, declines in weeks worked per year are the main factor in the
decline of annual earnings during preretirement years.” (p. 70). This suggestion remained some-
what overlooked. The pre-retirement pattern we document conforms to the more general notion of
retirement advocated by Heckman (1976): “Retirement can more generally be defined as a period
with few hours of work supplied to the market.” (p. S15). The pattern of non-declining wages and
falling hours shortly after age 50 imposes nontrivial restrictions on quantitative aggregate mod-
els. In particular, such a pattern is inconsistent with a benchmark life cycle model with stationary
uncertainty, complete markets, wages independent of past labor supply, and constant disutility of
work along the life cycle. We discuss at the end of the paper the extent to which alternative de-
partures from the benchmark model reconcile theory and data. In brief, the two departures that
seem best able to reproduce the empirical pattern are endogenous wages from on-the-job training
(leading to skills that do not depreciate until very late in life) and increasing marginal disutility
of work (or increasing marginal utility of alternatives to work for pay) shortly after age 50—not
necessarily because of changing preferences. Additionally, we provide the numerical life cycle
profiles that quantitative models should reproduce.
It is important to clarify what this paper is not about. First, the focus here is on the intensive
margin of labor supply. That is, when we construct the empirical hours profile and when we try to
reproduce it in the model we consider hours per worker, not hours per person. The reason why we
do not deal with the extensive margin here is that retirement choices are already well understood
withing the life cycle model. We know from related research that technological features such as
nonconvexities in the mapping between hours and labor services (e.g., Rogerson and Wallenius
(2009), Erosa et al. (2011)) and institutional features such as social security rules (e.g., French
(2005), Erosa et al. (2012)) allow a match of extensive margin behavior late in the life cycle. It
is the intensive margin pattern we document here that is less explored. A first-order concern with
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our intensive margin focus is that the pattern of declining hours in spite of non-declining wages
may be an artifact of extensive margin movements. We will show that this is not the case. Second,
we do not attempt to separate age, time, and cohort effects on life cycle profiles. Our analysis
produces evidence that researchers should take into account, namely that workers in many cohorts
substantially reduce labor supply along the intensive margin despite facing a non-declining wage
profile, whatever the reasons why wages do not fall for these cohorts. We do not need to take
a stand on these reasons. One possibility is that there are pure time or cohort effects at work.
Another is that human capital depreciates only slowly, or not at all. Yet another explanation is
that incentive contracts are in place and the observed wage profile does not track the individual
productivity profile closely.1 This is certainly a very interesting question for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 connects the paper to the litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 illustrates how these data restrict the theory. Section 5
concludes. In the Appendix we report tables containing the numerical wage, hours, and earnings
profiles (raw and smoothed profiles) that can be readily used in quantitative analysis. These, of
course, are also available in electronic format at our research pages.
2 Connection to the literature
From a historical viewpoint, among the theories developed to characterize life cycle profiles, a
prominent position is occupied by the human capital model, initiated by Ben-Porath (1967) and
further developed by Ghez and Becker (1975), Blinder and Weiss (1976), Ryder et al. (1976),
Heckman (1976), and Rosen (1976). Variants of this model have become a workhorse in dynamic
macroeconomics and typically predict that wage, hours, and earnings profiles are “hump-shaped”.
In this model the wage rate is the return on human capital, and grows as long as net investment
increases the stock of skills. As the end of working life approaches, investment in human capital
optimally falls below depreciation and the wage rate declines, tracing out a hump-shaped profile.
The hours profile has the same shape because the substitution effect induces workers to work more
when wages are higher. The earnings profile, then, is also hump shaped. The left portion of
Figure 1, reproduced from Weiss (1986), illustrates the typical dynamics generated by the human
capital model, evidently to fit the data observed at the time it was developed, as summarized by
Weiss (1986), p. 603: “The major stylized facts which the theory attempts to explain are: a life
cycle earnings profile which is increasing at early ages and is declining towards the end of the
working period. A wage profile which tends to increase over the life cycle with a weak tendency
for wage reduction towards the end of the working period. An hours of work life cycle profile
which is increasing at early ages and declining at older ages, with the peak occurring earlier than
in the earnings or wage profiles.” When these empirical regularities were first isolated the main data
sources were cross-sectional, so “the major stylized facts which the theory attempt[ed] to explain”
1The works, among others, of Becker and Stigler (1974), Lazear (1979), Lazear (1981), Freeman (1977), Medoff
and Abraham (1980), Medoff and Abraham (1981), MacDonald (1982), and Harris and Holstrom (1982) show that,
at the individual leve, wage growth is possible even in the absence of human capital (and productivity, more gener-
ally) growth. In this case the wage profile need not decline towards the end of the working life, even if individual
productivity did. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) offer a thorough review of this literature.
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were mostly derived from synthetic cohorts.2 We produce and report in the right portion of Figure 1
the wage, hours, and earnings profiles that a researcher would have observed applying the synthetic
cohort fiction to the 1970 cross-section of the PSID. They clearly resemble the theoretical profiles.
Figure 1: Theoretical and 1970 PSID synthetic cohort profiles
Notes: The figure on the left illustrates the theoretical life cycle profiles in the human capital model, and is reproduced
from Weiss (1986). The figure on the right illustrates the empirical profiles constructed using the synthetic cohort
method from the 1970 cross section of the PSID. The wage and earnings profiles result from adding 1% annual real
wage growth to the raw cross sectional profiles, corresponding to the BLS estimate of productivity growth—this is
roughly the average growth rate of labor productivity in the US since 1970. That is, the wage of an individual a years
old in the cross section is multiplied by (1.01)a−18, where 18 is the conventional age of the youngest worker in the
1970 cross section. The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial.
However, synthetic cohorts may produce a biased picture of the life cycle when productivity
changes in time. Thornton et al. (1997) and Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) offer an illustration for
annual and weekly earnings, respectively. When using repeated cross sections to form pseudo
panels, many researchers have reached similar conclusions—i.e., wages decline in the second part
of the working life and hours track them. For instance, Browning et al. (1985) apply this procedure
to British household heads in the Family Expenditure Survey and find that wages peak around mid-
working life and then decline, and similarly for hours. The increasing availability of longitudinal
data has allowed a more direct look at actual portions of workers’ careers by following them over
time. As far as the wage profile is concerned, these analyses have tended to confirm the suggestion
of Mincer (1974) that the profile is not hump-shaped—see, for instance, Johnson and Neumark
(1996) and references therein. In particular, Johnson and Neumark (1996) use panel data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men to infer the dynamics of male wages during the
late portion of the working life, and do not find clear evidence of negative wage growth until
workers are in their 60s. They do not consider the associated labor supply behavior, however.
Recent research in macroeconomics, based on micro panel data, has focused on earnings profiles,
finding that they are hump-shaped. Examples include Huggett et al. (2007), and Heathcote et al.
2By synthetic cohort we mean the time series constructed from a cross-section at, say, time t using the a+ j years
olds at time t as a counterfactual for the a years olds at time t+ j.
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(2008). The dynamics of earnings, however, results from both wages and hours of work, and it is of
interest to look separately at these two distinct (although not necessarily independent) processes.
We improve upon this research by taking a systematic approach to the analysis of life cycle profiles
in longitudinal data. Ours is a joint analysis of wages, hours, and earnings profiles of both men
and women in multiple cohorts. Furthermore, we consider the entire life cycle, not only the late
working life, by exploiting the full longitudinal dimension of the PSID (1968-2009).
A number of additional recent papers in macroeconomics are directly or incidentally concerned
with life cycle profiles. Among them, French (2005) studies the effect of health and social security
rules on hours and retirement behavior of American male household heads. As a preliminary step
in his structural investigation, French uses the annual portion of the PSID (1968-1997) to estimate
wage and hours profiles. He finds that the wage profile is hump-shaped, although the most visible
decline does not happen before age 62. The hours profile he estimates is also declining, with the
trend changing a bit later than we estimate. French notes that, “Most of the variation in the wage
and labor supply profiles is from individuals aged 55-65 [...]. [The] decline in hours coincides
closely with the decline in wages” (p. 412). Apparently, this contrasts with our results despite
using much of the same data. However, the samples used are different (Male head of households
1968–1997 in French, all individuals 1968–2009 here), as well as the estimation methods. For the
wage profile, French uses the prediction from a fixed-effects regression of wages—corrected for
tied wage-hours effect—on a quartic function of age, conditioning on health status and family size,
and pooling all cohorts; we report simple raw profiles by cohort. Relative to these differences, the
dissimilarities between ours and French’s estimates seem unimportant.
Kuruscu (2006) estimates the return to on-the-job training using NLSY data. This data set does
not yet allow the observation of wages of older workers, so he assumes that the wage profile is not
declining late in the working life, based on limited evidence from cross-sectional data as well as
the PSID. Correspondingly, he assumes that human capital does not depreciate in his model. Our
analysis confirms the soundness of such an assumption. In Kuruscu’s model, however, labor is
inelastically supplied, and this puts aside the question of what happens to hours.
Imai and Keane (2004) study a human capital model to reconcile small and large intertemporal
elasticities of labor supply at the individual and aggregate level. The model is estimated using data
from the NLSY, like Kuruscu (2006), and produces out-of-sample (i.e., after age 40) predictions
that have the shape of the profiles in Figure 1. As far as the shape of the wage profile is concerned,
the difference between Imai and Keane (2004) and Kuruscu (2006) originates in different assump-
tions about whether human capital depreciates or not. Nonetheless, as we illustrate later, Imai and
Keane (2004) offers a key insight, investment in human capital increases substantially the oppor-
tunity cost of time early in the life cycle, to reconcile a non-declining wage profile and a declining
hours profile. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), like Imai and Keane (2004), are interested in under-
standing the discrepancy between micro and macro elasticities of labor supply. The main feature
of their model is a nonconvexity (a flat initial portion in the mapping between hours of work and
labor services) that generates motives for entering and exiting the labor force at specific points in
the life cycle. Their model takes the wage profile as exogenous and assumes it is hump-shaped.
This implies that hours decline before retirement. In this model, the only way one can generate the
decline in hours (and the other results) when wages do not decline is by assuming that the disutility
of working increases at later stages in the life cycle. This is another possibility we explore at the
end of this paper.
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3 Data
Our main data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We also use the Current
Population Survey (CPS) as a check against small sample size and attrition. As will become clear,
we believe the advantages of using the PSID as base data outweigh the disadvantages. After the
full release of the 2009 wave at the end of 2011, the PSID offers the unique opportunity to observe
individual life cycle profiles spanning 41 years. This amounts to virtually the entire working life
of the cohorts who entered the labor market at the end of the 1960s. We use individual-level
data containing demographic, socioeconomic and labor market information from 1967 to 2008, for
different cohorts.3 We compute averages of hourly wages, hours, and earnings for a given cohort
and all available years to trace the life cycle profiles of individuals in that cohort. This raises
a fundamental selection problem (we only observe wages for workers) which we postpone until
section 3.2. Attrition is also a potential problem, because we follow individuals for up to 41 years.
This issue, too, is postponed until section 3.2. We anticipate here that these processes do not affect
our results. Wages and earnings are before-tax and are expressed in constant 2010 dollars using
the CPI-U as deflator. In order to have a sufficient number of observations to compute meaningful
averages, we define cohorts based on 5-year bins and use the central value of the bin to keep track
of the age of the cohort. For instance, workers who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967 we
define as the “23 years old” cohort (or “cohort 23”, fort short), those who where between 26 and 30
years old in 1967 are the “28 years old” cohort, etc. We can use eight such cohorts from the PSID.
The youngest is the 23 years old cohort (i.e., those born between 1942 and 1946), and the oldest
is the 58 years old cohort (i.e., those born between 1907 and 1911). The former is the cohort we
analyze more closely, because it is the only one for which we can observe the entire working life.
The older cohorts (as opposed to the younger ones, relative to cohort 23) are of interest because it is
the shape of life cycle profiles during the late stages of the working life that we want to emphasize.
Wage rates are directly observed for workers paid by the hour (about 1/3 of the total) and those
that are estimated are done so by the ratio between annual hours and annual earnings. It is well
known that this procedure, albeit standard, leads to measurement error in hourly wages. This
problem here is vastly mitigated by averaging across individuals in the cohort. In constructing our
final sample we apply the following selection criteria. First, we restrict our analysis to households
belonging to the SRC sample.4 Second, self-employed individuals are excluded from the analysis
both because their wage rate is more likely to be measured with error, and because their wage is a
mix of labor and capital income. Third, we exclude individuals whose nominal wage rate in a given
year is less that 50% the federal minimum wage in force that year. Fourth, in order to eliminate
outliers we trim the distribution of wages, hours, and earnings at or above the top 1% and at or
3A year in our data set refers to the period a variable refers to, not the period in which the data were actually col-
lected. For instance, the 1968 wave collected information referring to year 1967, the 1969 wave collected information
referring to year 1968, and so on.
4The core sample of the PSID originates from two distinct samples: a cross-sectional national representative sample
of about 3000 households (the 1968 SRC sample) and a non-representative sample of about 2000 low-income families
located in metropolitan areas (the SEO sample). The SRC sample was representative of the U.S. population back in
1967, so there is no guarantee that it is representative during the following 41 years. However, this is the group that
maximizes the representativeness of our sample across the four decades. Another way to make the PSID representative
of the U.S. population is to apply individual sampling weights to the full core sample. Unfortunately, this cannot be
done in a consistent way across all of the 41 waves. Fiorito and Zanella (2012) illustrate how representative the
components of the PSID core sample are.
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below the bottom 1% every year. This eliminates a handful of observations every year. Trimming
at the top helps taking care of top–coded wage information, which we do not correct otherwise.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of relevant demographic and socio–economic characteristics for
8 different cohorts, over the entire 1967–2008 period.
Table 1: Summary statistics by cohort
Cohort (age in 1967)
Variable 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58
Sample size in 1967 497 470 484 580 500 504 415 386
Age 39.6 44.2 49.2 53.9 58.0 61.7 65.7 69.1
(11.2) (11.2) (11.2) (11.0) (10.7) (10.1) (9.3) (8.5)
Male 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.42
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
White 0.92 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89
(0.26) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31)
Black 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
(0.21) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.29) (0.28)
Disability 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.42
(0.34) (0.35) (0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49)
Married 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.59
(0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.45) (0.47) (0.49)
Widowed 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.32
(0.13) (0.19) (0.24) (0.29) (0.34) (0.41) (0.44) (0.47)
Divorced 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.31) (0.30) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
Separated 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Children 1.15 1.15 0.99 0.70 0.42 0.28 0.14 0.10
(1.25) (1.43) (1.48) (1.23) (0.97) (0.82) (0.56) (0.49)
College or more 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.11
(0.43) (0.40) (0.39) (0.39) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26) (0.32)
High School 0.43 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.35 0.27
(0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45)
Less than High School 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.36 0.35 0.50 0.51
(0.34) (0.42) (0.44) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
Total family income 84.01 87.04 85.16 84.00 69.58 62.74 50.61 47.20
(71.32) (90.35) (79.75) (84.29) (54.07) (53.06) (50.60) (73.08)
Notes: The table contains means and (in parentheses) standard deviations. A cohort is labelled by age in 1967, and
results from pooling into a five-year bin individuals belonging to five adjacent one-year bins. For example, cohort 23 is
composed of individuals who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967. “Disability” is the share of individuals who
report having a condition that limits the amount of type of work they can do. “Children” is the number of individuals
below age 18 living in one’s household. “Total family income” is the sum of all individual gross incomes (from all
sources, including losses) in one’s family, and is expressed in thousands of 2010 U.S. dollars.
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3.1 Empirical profiles
We begin with an illustration of raw life cycle profiles in the PSID for the “23 years old” cohort,
the only one for which we observe virtually the entire working life. Individuals in this cohort
were between 21 and 25 years old at the first observation in 1967 and between 62 and 66 years
old at the last available observation in 2008. Figure 2 illustrates the wage, earnings, and hours
profiles of this cohort, as well as the share reporting “retired” as labor market status each year.
The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial, except for hours where a
fourth-order polynomial is used.5 The figure shows that the wage profile is increasing throughout
the working life, and does not show any tendency to decline. Wage growth is sustained until about
age 40 and modest between 40 and 50—two well-known facts—but virtually zero thereafter. The
earnings, profile, instead, has the familiar hump-shape: earnings reach a maximum around age 50
and then decline visibly. The hours profile shows that hours increase slowly until age 50 and then
fall sharply, thus driving earnings down. Starting at this same age, more and more individuals in
the cohort begin classifying themselves as retired.
Figure 2: Life cycle profiles: cohort 23
Notes: The figure reports wage, hours, earnings, and retirement profiles of individuals who where between 21 and 25
year old in 1967 (cohort 23). The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial, except for hours
where a fourth-order polynomial is used.
5A fourth order polynomial is more appropriate for hours, given the sharp turning point. Since no such turning
point is obvious for wages, a second order polynomial is preferable. We smooth earnings like wages to allow a more
direct comparison of the two profiles.
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We now decompose these profiles by gender and education. Figure 3 shows the gender decom-
position. Wages, both in levels and growth rates, are lower for women, as are earnings. While
earnings are hump-shaped, wages show only a modest tendency to decline for women. The hours
profile of men is flat from shortly after the beginning of the working life until shortly after age
50, when it falls sharply. Women, instead, reduce hours until about age 30 and then increase them
steadily until shortly after age 50—this is what drives the slow increase in the aggregate hours
profile. At that point hours fall at a rate comparable to that of men. The hours profile of women
clearly reflects the importance of part–time jobs in this group, as well as fertility choices. The
figure also shows that there are no relevant gender differences in retirement rates in this cohort.
Figure 3: Life cycle profiles: cohort 23, by gender
Notes: The figure reports wage, hours, earnings, and retirement profiles by gender of individuals who where between
21 and 25 years old in 1967 (cohort 23). The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial, except
for hours where a fourth-order polynomial is used.
Figure 4 shows the decomposition by education. We consider two groups: college degree
and high school degree or less. The wage profiles of the two groups grow at a comparable rate
until about age 30. Thereafter, the profile of the less educated is virtually flat and that of college
graduates keeps growing at a sustained rate until age 50. At that point there is some negative wage
growth. Both earnings profiles decline after age 50, when hours fall sharply at a similar rate. The
hours profile of college graduates, however, is above the profile of non graduates (the difference
is about 200 hours), except during a worker’s 20s, when college graduates are allocating most of
their time to education and training and so work less. Finally, the picture suggests that the less
educated tend to retire earlier.
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Table 2 summarizes the percentage changes of raw wage, earnings, and hours between ages
23 and 51, and between ages 51 and 64 in this cohort, for the whole sample and by gender and
education.
Figure 4: Life cycle profiles: cohort 23, by education
Notes: The figure reports wage, hours, earnings, and retirement profiles by level of education (college degree and high
school dregree or less, respectively) of individuals who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967 (cohort 23). The
interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial, except for hours where a fourth-order polynomial is
used.
Table 2: Cumulative variations in the raw data, cohort 23
% wage change % earnings change % hours change
23–51 51–64 23–51 51–64 23–51 51–64
All 51.3 –0.6 70.6 –24.0 11.2 –29.1
Males 65.5 2.5 75.0 –21.7 4.0 –32.4
Females 35.5 –6.2 78.8 –31.7 21.9 –25.2
College 59.3 –10.8 81.4 –24.8 20.6 –27.2
No college 24.1 13.1 28.8 –22.4 3.7 –32.1
Notes: The table reports the percentage change in hourly wages, earnings, and hours of market work for individuals
who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967 (cohort 23), for the whole sample as well as by gender and education.
The variations are between age 23 and 51, and between age 51 and 64, and refer to the raw PSID data plotted in
Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4.
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So far we have considered the youngest cohort for which we can observe the entire life cycle.
While we can conjecture that the shape of the wage profile is invariant across cohorts in the early
stages of the life cycle, the shape at the end is a more sensitive issue. It could be that cohort 23
benefited from positive aggregate shocks in the final years of the career, between 2000 and 2008.
Absent such shocks the wage profile might have exhibited a hump-shape. We can look at older
cohorts to check that the pattern we have isolated is not driven by shocks that affected cohort 23.
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 illustrate the wage, earnings and hours profiles of the eight cohorts
summarized in Table 1.6 These pictures reproduce the pattern observed in Figure 2, with only two
exceptions as far as the wage profile is concerned: cohort 43 and cohort 48. The wage decline
for both these cohorts begins around 1980, when the two groups are between 54 and 58, and 59
and 63 years old, respectively, and continues afterward until they reach age 63-67 (i.e., age 65
in the picture). This may be due to cohort-specific shocks, in the form of large recessions near
retirement age: it is possible that these older workers may have been more adversely affected by
the 1980-1982 recessions. The last panel of each picture overlaps the profiles of the 9 cohorts.
While the hours profiles are almost perfectly overlapped (with some increase in hours for the two
of the youngest cohorts7) the wage and earnings profiles shift upward for younger cohorts. This,
of course, reflects productivity growth.
Figure 5: Wage profile, all cohorts
Notes: The figure reports the wage profiles of all the cohorts who were in the labor market in 1967. The interpolating
line is the best second-order fractional polynomial.
6These profiles are truncated at age 65 (i.e., when individuals in the cohort are between 63 and 67 years old): in
our data set the group of workers in a specific cohort after that age is too small to provide reliable estimates.
7This is consistent with the evidence reported in papers that analyze time use trends across different cohorts. See,
for instance, figures 21 and 22 in Attanasio et al. (2012)
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Figure 6: Earnings profile, all cohorts
Notes: The figure reports the earnings profiles of all the cohorts who were in the labor market in 1967. The interpo-
lating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial.
Figure 7: Hours profile, all cohorts
Notes: The figure reports the hours profiles of all the cohorts who were in the labor market in 1967. The interpolating
line is the best fourth-order fractional polynomial.
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We next investigate how workers reduce hours along the life cycle, a process we refer to as
“pre-retirement”. The main margins of adjustment are likely two: switching from full-time to
part-time and reducing overtime hours. Figure 8 shows that this is exactly what happens for the
23-years old cohort. The figure shows kernel density estimates of the distribution of hours when
the cohort is between 47 and 52 year old (that is, at the peak of hours) and ten years later, when
the cohort is between 57 and 62 year old. The figure shows that the distribution at the early
stage is concentrated around the full-time level of hours, and has fat tails, indicating that a non-
negligible portion of workers are employed part-time or do overtime work. However, ten years
later there is a large decrease in the density at full-time, the right tail is thinner, and the distribution
looks bimodal–there is a second peak, likely around part-time hours. Therefore, ignoring for a
moment selection into employment (an issue we tackle below), this picture suggests that many
senior workers switch to part-time mode and reduce overtime work. This pattern is confirmed
when we decompose the distribution by gender and education, as illustrated in Figure 9. Given
the possibly relevant role of moves from full- to part-time during the pre-retirement years, the
existence of a negative part-time premium on hourly wages documented by Aaronson and French
(2004) suggests that pre-retirement adjustments may lead to underestimating productivity growth
late in the working life. This reinforces the pattern we are documenting.
Figure 8: Distribution of hours
Notes: The figure shows the kernel density estimate (Epanechnikov kernel) of hours worked on the market by indi-
viduals who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967 at two different points in time: when they are between 47 and
52 years old and ten years later, when they are between 57 and 62 years old.
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Figure 9: Distribution of hours, by gender and education
Notes: The figure shows, by gender and education, the kernel density estimate (Epanechnikov kernel) of hours worked
on the market by individuals who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967 at two different points in time: when
they are between 47 and 52 years old and ten years later, when they are between 57 and 62 years old.
To sum up the finding documented in this section, the empirical regularity that emerges from
our analysis shows that the life cycle earnings profile is increasing at early ages and is declining
after age 50. The wage profile, however, increases over the life cycle with no clear tendency to
decline before age 65 (with the exception of 2 cohorts out of 8). Women and college graduates
are a possible exception, with some negative wage growth after age 60. Therefore, earnings fall
because of a reduction in hours of market work along the intensive margin. Such a reduction is
sizeable (about 1/3, on average) and constitutes a smooth transition into retirement via reduction
of overtime work and switch to a part-time work mode.
A concern is that this pattern may be an artifact of staggered retirement, selection out of em-
ployment, and attrition. We next address these three threats to the picture we are rendering.
3.2 Is this pattern an artifact?
So far we have ignored three important processes that may give the false appearance of a smoothly
declining hours profile and a non-declining wage profile. They are all manifestations of the se-
lection problem. That is, they all have to do with the crucial fact that we observe wages only for
individuals who are interviewed and work in a given year and, for the sub-sample of these that
leave employment during that year, we measure hours only up to the day they stop working.
First, the pattern of a smooth decline of the aggregate hours profile in spite of a non-declining
wage profile could result from staggered, abrupt retirement at points different from the end of
the year. The following example illustrates what this means. Suppose that workers either work
full-time at a given hourly wage or do not work at all, and that individuals can retire only on July
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1st of any year. In this case the true individual hours profile is flat at 2000 hours until the year
before retirement, has an intermediate point at 1000 hours in the retirement year, and is flat at zero
hours afterwards. The wage profile, instead, is flat. Now suppose that 10% of workers retire at
age 57, 20% of those remaining retire at 58, 30% at 59, and so on, until all remaining workers
retire at 65. This would induce a smoothly declining aggregate hours profile (in correspondence to
non-declining wages) while the true underlying individual profiles are discontinuous.
Second, our sample changes over time because of selection into and out of employment. The
selection problem in this context is easy to see: as Figure 2 illustrates, around age 50 workers
begin self-selecting into retirement. This process is very likely non-random with respect to wages,
earnings, and hours. Consider the wage profile and suppose that low-wage workers retire first, or
that it is precisely a negative wage shock that induces workers to retire. Then our sample would
change in a way that leads to overestimating wage growth late in the working life: we would render
a non-declining selected profile while the true underlying profile is actually declining.
Third, our sample changes over time because of attrition. Focusing on specific cohorts in a
panel that included about 3000 households (the SRC sample) at its outset in 1967 means working
with relatively few individuals, as attested by the rist line of Table 1. The fact that we follow them
for up to 40 years makes things worse because the attrition rate is substantial. Consider the 23
years old cohort. In 1967 this comprised about 500 individuals. At the last data point, in 2008,
little more than 300.
Is the empirical regularity we have isolated an artifact of these three processes? The answer is
no. In what follows we carefully motivate this answer.
3.2.1 Pre-retirement vs. abrupt retirement during the year
Rogerson and Wallenius (2011) claim on the basis of PSID data that “abrupt retirement” (i.e.,
moving from, say, full-time hours to zero hours with an intermediate level of hours in the year
a worker retires) is by far the most important retirement mode in the U.S.—more than 70% of
workers. This, apparently, contrasts with the preretirement pattern we have documented above. To
understand the difference between these two retirement modes, consider Figure 10. These pictures
reproduce the individual profiles of two workers in the 23 years old cohort. Panel A refers to a
worker (a man) who is retiring along a preretirement pattern. He works at a full-time level (i.e.,
about 2000 hours per year) until age 55, and then switches to a part-time level (i.e., about 1000
hours), with a declining trend thereafter. Panel B, instead, refers to a worker (another man) who
moves abruptly from full-time work to zero hours at age 58, through an intermediate step of 330
hours—these are presumably worked during the first two months of the retirement year, which
is year 2000. There are 78 individuals in cohort 23 for whom we can inspect individual hours
profile like the two we have just illustrated (i.e., 78 individuals in the cohort who work every year
from 1967 until 1997 and who remain in the survey and may move to zero hours afterwards.).
Of these 78 profiles, 26 look like case A in Figure 10, 28 look like case B, 15 are non-declining,
and 9 are hard to interpret. This indicates that pre-retirement is more important a mode than the
analysis in Rogerson and Wallenius (2011) suggests, although abrupt retirement is important too.
The contrast with Rogerson and Wallenius (2011) is in fact only apparent, because they restrict
the sample to individuals who worked at least 1750 hours after age 56. This selection procedure
removes workers who are already on a preretirement path like the worker in panel A of Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Retirement modes: abrupt retirement vs. preretirement path
Notes: The figure shows two individual profiles of workers who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967. Worker
in panel A moves into retirement through a preretirement stage at part-time hours. Worker in panel B moves into
retirement by switching abruptly to zero hours. The interpolating line is the best fourth-order fractional polynomial.
However, given the relevance of abrupt retirement one may still worry that the pattern of a
smoothly declining aggregate hours profile and non-declining wage profile may be an artifact of
extensive margin movements, as the example given at the beginning of this section illustrates.
There is a simple way to demonstrate that this is not the case: shut off the extensive margin entirely.
This can be done by considering the group of individuals in the cohort who are employed every year
from 1967 to 2008. These are referred to as the “continuously employed.” For these individuals,
there are no extensive margin movements at the annual frequency in the period of observation.
Their number is of course tiny in a single cohort: in the 23 years old cohort they are just 38. Despite
such small sample size, if the shape of the wage and hours profiles of this group is not different from
that of the larger sample then we have evidence that the pattern we have isolated is not an artifact of
self-selection out of employment towards the end of the life cycle. Figure 15 illustrates that this is
indeed the case. The levels are of course different, and reflect the different labor market attachment
in the two groups. Those more attached—i.e., those who do not experience unemployment nor
leave the labor force for more than 11 months—have higher wages and work more hours. But the
shape of the profiles is the same in the two groups. In particular, those in the cohort who are not yet
retired by 2008 are clearly moving along a pre-retirement path despite no clear downward trend in
wages, similar to the pattern in the full sample.
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Figure 11: Wage and hours profiles: cohort 23, full sample vs. continuously employed
Notes: The figure reports wage and hours profiles of individuals who where between 21 and 25 years old in 1967
(cohort 23), for the full sample and for the sample of those who are employed every year from 1967 to 2008 (i.e., the
“continuously employed”). The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial for wages and the
best fourth-order fractional polynomial for hours.
3.2.2 Attrition
To show that attrition does not affect the pattern, we first provide two informal checks based on
a comparison with the Current Population Survey (CPS) and with the no-attrition group in the
PSID, respectively, and then perform formal tests. The first informal check consists of constructing
equivalent life cycle profiles for the same cohorts from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS.
Attrition is not an issue in the CPS: finding a similar pattern would suggest it is not issue in the
PSID either, as far as the shape of life cycle profiles is concerned.8 To perform such a check we use
the CPS data set constructed by Heathcote et al. (2010). These data result from applying selection
criteria similar to those we applied to the PSID, and cover the 1967–2005 period. Because the
sample size is now much larger we can expand (relative to Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7) the
upper limit of the age interval to 70 years without having to worry about unreliable estimates.
Figure 12 illustrates the resulting wage profile. This picture confirms the patter found in the PSID,
at least for the four youngest cohorts. The wage profiles of the four oldest cohorts look hump-
shaped. Wage growth becomes negative shortly before 60 for cohorts 43 and 48, consistently with
the PSID, but not before 65 for the two oldest cohort. Figure 13, and Figure 14 illustrate the
earnings and hours profiles. Except for the 23 years old cohort (which we observe only until age
61 in this CPS data set) the CPS also replicates the shape of earnings and hours profiles in the
PSID.9
8Using CPS data also provides a useful check with respect to small sample size in the PSID.
9There is an issue about the level of hours, which turn out to be slightly higher in the CPS than in the PSID—
between about 30 and 120 hours. This difference may reflect the different wording of the survey questions (hours
usually worked per week in the CPS versus hours actually worked per week in the PSID).
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Figure 12: Wage profile in the CPS, all cohorts
Figure 13: Earnings profile in the CPS, all cohorts
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Figure 14: Hours profile in the CPS, all cohorts
Notes: Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14 are the CPS analog of Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. They illustrate the
hours, earnings, and hours profiles of all the cohorts who were in the labor market in 1967, from the March CPS. The
interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial, except for hours where a fourth-order polynomial is
used.
The second informal check consists of comparing the profiles of the full, but selected sample
(because of attrition), with the profiles of the group of individuals in the cohort who are present in
the survey every year from 1967 to 2008. We refer to these individuals as the “always present”,
and there are about 270 such individuals in the cohort. If the profiles of these two groups are
different, then we have evidence that attrition is selective with respect to the three variables of
interest. If instead they do not differ, then we have evidence that, with respect to these variables,
individuals leave the survey at random. This comparison is illustrated in Figure 15. We do not
observe systematic differences in this picture.
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Figure 15: Life cycle profiles: cohort 23, full sample vs. no-attrition group
Notes: The figure reports wage, hours, earnings, and retirement profiles of individuals who where between 21 and
25 years old in 1967 (cohort 23), for the full sample and for the sample of individuals who are present in the survey
every year from 1967 to 2008 (i.e., the no-attrition group). The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional
polynomial, except for hours and the fraction retired where a fourth-order polynomial is used.
Finally, we test for the presence of attrition bias formally using a parametric, Heckman-type
two-step procedure. We follow Wooldridge (2010), chapter 19.9.3, who suggests first-differencing
the data and working with the usual pair of equations, one for outcome and one for selection:
∆yit = ∆xitβ +∆εit , (1)
sit = I[qitγ+ eit > 0], (2)
where yit is the variable of interest (wage rate, earnings, or hours), xit is a vector of time-varying
covariates, I[.] is the indicator function, sit is the selection indicator, keeping track of whether
individual i is present (sit = 1) in the survey or not (sit = 0), qit is a vector containing variables
that may correlate with the attrition process and that are observable for at least one period after
attrition, and eit is an unobservable term with a standardized normal distribution.10
10We include in xit the following variables: age, whether married, number of children living in the household,
whether college degree or more, non-labor income, whether lives with an employed partner, whether unemployed,
whether disabled, and whether relocated during the year. As for qit , we include in this vector the first lag of x (i.e.,
xit−1) as well as six permanent characteristics: whether ever obtained a college degree, maximum number of children
ever lived in the household, whether white, whether ever been unemployed, whether ever reported a disability, whether
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The test is based on three assumptions. First, attrition is an absorbing state, i.e. sit+ j = 0 for all
j > 0 when sit = 0. This is straightforward to impose on the data. Second, the conditional mean of
∆εit is linear: E[∆εit |eit ,sit ] = ρteit . Third, both ∆εit and eit are independent of qit . Then it follows
from these assumptions that
E[∆yit |∆xit ,qit ,sit−1 = 1] = ∆xitβ +ρtλ (qitγ), (3)
where λ (.) is the inverse Mills ratio. The latter can be estimated for each period via pooled Probit
and interacted with time dummies to allow for a time-varying ρ in Eq. (3). This equation is then
estimated via pooled two-stage least squares (clustering standard errors at the individual level and
allowing for heteroskedasticity), using a subset of qit as an instrument for ∆xit .11 Then, the null
hypothesis of no attrition bias is equivalent to the joint hypothesis that ρt = 0 in each period, which
is straightforward to test. Since Eq. (3) is in first-difference, we base the test on the annual portion
of the PSID (1967-1996). We cannot reject the null for either wages (P-value: 0.15), earnings
(P-value: 0.14), or hours (P-value: 0.24).12
Based on this informal and formal evidence we conclude that attrition, although non-negligible,
is unlikely to have serious consequences for inferring the shape of life cycle profiles in our data.
This conclusion is consistent with what is known about attrition in the PSID at large, at least until
the end of the 1990s: Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and Lillard and Panis (1998) conclude that despite
being selective, attrition has not undermined the representativeness of the PSID and that ignoring
it when estimating the dynamics of variables of interest has probably only mild consequences.
3.2.3 Self-selection
We finally address selection. In Section 3.2.1 we have already provided an informal check based
on a comparison with the group of continuously employed individuals in the PSID. This is con-
ceptually equivalent to the second informal check on attrition bias illustrated in Figure 15. That
is, we compared the profiles of the full, but selected sample (because of self-selection into em-
ployment), with the profiles of continuously employed workers. Figure 11 suggests that selection
affects the levels but not the shape of the profiles. Here we provide a more formal check by pro-
ducing a selection-corrected wage profile. We use the procedure for selection-correction in panel
data developed by Wooldridge (1995),13 and we keep focusing on the 23 years old cohort for il-
lustrative purposes. The procedure is an extension of standard two-stage methods valid for cross
sectional data such as “Tobit” and “Heckit”. Specifically, we predict wages of individuals who
are not employed in a given year—but for whom we observe covariates in that year as well as in
other periods—using the coefficients of a wage regression consistently estimated. Consistency is
ever relocated.
11We use xit−1 as instruments. The rationale for using lags of levels to instrument first differences is illustrated in
Arellano (1989).
12The following, much simpler test confirms this result: estimate in levels using the fixed-effects estimator and
including sit+1 as an additional right-hand variable; then test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on sit+1 is zero.
The intuition is that if the attrition process is random with respect to wages, earnings, and hours, then the attrition
indicator in the next period should not help predicting any of these variables.
13Correcting the hours profile (and so the earnings profile as well) is harder with the procedure we use below: it’s
very hard to maintain credibly that the unobservable determinants of hours are uncorrelated with the unobservable
determinants of the decision to supply a positive amount of hours.
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achieved as follows. As in the case of the attrition test illustrated above, the model consists of a
pair of equations, one for outcome (the wage rate) and one for selection into employment—the
latter now takes the Tobit form because selection is determined by a corner solution in the labor
supply problem.
wit = xitβ +θi+ εit , (4)
hit = max(0,Xiγ+υit), (5)
where wit is the wage rate, hit hours, xit time-varying covariates, Xi contains vectors xit at all leads
and lags (in practice, feasibility requires us to replace these with the corresponding longitudinal av-
erages), and υit is normally distributed and independent of Xi. It is understood that wit is observed
if and only if hit > 0. Under the mean conditional independence assumptionE[εit |Xi,θi,hit > 0] = 0
β can be consistently estimated via pooled OLS after including in Eq. (4) the Tobit residuals from
Eq. (5) estimated for each period as additional regressors. Using this procedure, we obtain a coun-
terfactual wage profile—i.e., the profile we would have observed under the maintained identifying
assumptions had those workers who retired remained employed. The observed and counterfactual
wage profiles for the 23-years old cohort are reported in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Selection-corrected wage profile
Notes: The figure reports the observed average wage profile of individuals who where between 21 and 25 years old
in 1967 (cohort 23), and the corresponding profile after prediction of missing wages through a selection-correction
procedure. The interpolating line is the best second-order fractional polynomial.
This figure shows that the non-declining wage profile we have documented is not an artifact of
selection. During the early part of the working life there seems to be “negative selection” out of
employment. That is, the counterfactual wage profile is below the observed one, suggesting that
individuals who do not work would earn a lower hourly wage relative to those who work. How-
ever, towards the end of the working life there is “positive selection” into retirement: workers with
higher wages leave employment first. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Casanova
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(2010), who studies the wage process of older workers using panel data from the Health and Re-
tirement Study. She, too, finds evidence of positive selection into retirement. This evidence is,
however, inconsistent with French (2005), who finds that selection-corrected wages are 7% and
11% lower at age 62 and 65, respectively, relative to the uncorrected ones. However, in addition
to the differences we have already pointed out in Section 2, French uses a very different correction
procedure, based on assuming that selection bias in the PSID is the same as in his model, and com-
paring the wages of workers and non-workers in the model. In any case, as we show next, even
negative wage growth of the order of 10% at the end of the working life can hardly be replicated
in a benchmark life cycle model unless the intensive margin elasticity of labor supply is calibrated
to an implausibly large value.
4 A benchmark life cycle model
We now perform a very simple quantitative exercise aimed at understanding how accurately a
basic life cycle model explains the empirical regularities we have documented so far. The model
is stylized and intentionally simple. Not surprisingly, in its basic version it is unable to replicate
the pattern of falling hours when calibrated with reasonable parameters and the empirical wage
profile we have estimated. We explore which variants of the benchmark model, among those more
frequently considered in the macroeconomic literature, are able to reconcile facts and theory.
In this quantitative exercise we stick to the fiction of a representative worker who makes inten-
sive margin choices only. We do not attempt to replicate the important heterogeneity along gender
and education we documented above, nor extensive margin decisions. The reason is that the model
we want to use is too simple to capture such heterogeneity or retirement behavior in any meaning-
ful way. Furthermore, the analysis is built on a single cohort, so time and age are indistinguishable
in what follows. The representative worker enters the labor market at time 0 and dies at time T . For
the moment, assume there is no uncertainty. The problem is to choose sequences of consumption,
{ct}, labor supply, {ht}, and assets, {at+1}, given an exogenous wage profile, a sequence of real
interest rates, {rt}, and initial and terminal assets, to maximize utility over the life cycle:
max
{ct ,ht ,at+1}
T
∑
t=0
β t
v(ct)− γ h1+ 1εt
1+ 1ε

s.t. ct+at+1 ≤ at(1+ rt)+wtht
ht ≤ h
a0 = a
aT+1 = 0
where β is the discount factor, v(.) a quasi-concave increasing function, ε the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of labor, and h the time endowment. From the first-order conditions, the
dynamics of hours in this model, for t < T , is given by:
ht+1
ht
=
[
1
β (1+ rt+1)
wt+1
wt
]ε
. (6)
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The term 1/β (1+ rt+1) is the ratio between the multipliers on the budget constraint in two
adjacent periods and captures the income effect: the worker is moving along a known wage profile
and is accumulating assets optimally. The term wt+1/wt , on the other hand, captures the substitu-
tion effect. If the income effect is not too strong (i.e. β (1+ rt+1)≤ 1) then hours rise if wages do,
or fall if wages fall.
Eq. (6) can be used to predict the hours profile of the 23 years old cohort in the PSID. We
set β = 0.98, and ε = 0.12. This is the point estimate of intensive margin responses in the SRC
subsample of the PSID produced by Fiorito and Zanella (2012). Finally, we estimate the series
of rt as the difference between the annualized 6-Month Treasury Bill interest rate and the CPI-U
inflation rate from 1967 to 2008. We set h0 to 1800 hours per year and simulate hours forward based
on the actual PSID wage profile. The result of this simulation is shown in Figure 17. The model
reproduces reasonably well the empirical wage profile until age 50 and very badly afterwards,
because of the inability to generate the sharp fall in hours observed after this age.14 Given a non-
declining wage profile, the tracking between hours and wages prevents the model from generating
such a fall.
Figure 17: Actual and simulated hours profile
Notes: The figure reports the observed and simulated (from Eq. (6)) wage profiles of individuals in cohort 23.
Some departure from this benchmark model is needed in order to match the data. We consider
four possible departures that can potentially reconcile the benchmark model and the empirical pro-
files: (1) uncertainty about future wages; (2) borrowing constraints; (3) human capital investment
via on-the-job training; (4) time-varying disutility of labor. In all these cases hours can potentially
fall even if wages do not. We do not consider the incentives embedded in the Social Security
system. While it is well known that these affect labor supply, they primarily affect the extensive
margin. And when they do affect the intensive margin—e.g., by giving incentives to work less
hours—they do not do so until age 62.
14Gomme et al. (2004) also find that a standard life cycle model does not perform well when trying to explain the
hours of older workers.
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4.1 Uncertainty
As illustrated by Low (2005), if one introduces wage uncertainty in the benchmark model, then it
is possible to have declining hours in spite of an increasing wage profile. That is, it is possible to
observe high labor supply early in life when wages are low, and low labor supply later in life when
wages are high. Uncertainty breaks the close tracking between hours and wages. The intuition
is straightforward: when the wage rate is uncertain, workers are subject to a precautionary effect
and delay leisure until the late stages of the life cycle. The point can be illustrated analytically as
follows. Without uncertainty, the growth rate of hours, from Eq. (6), is approximately equal to:
∆ lnht+1 =−ε lnβ (1+ rt+1)+ ε∆ lnwt+1, (7)
where ∆ lnht+1 = lnht+1− lnht , and similarly for ∆ lnwt+1. If the wage rate is uncertain, then the
first-order conditions do not boil down to anything like Eq. (6). Instead, they boil down to:
h
1
ε
t
wt
= β (1+ rt)Et
 h 1εt+1
wt+1
 . (8)
Taking a second-order expansion of
h
1
ε
t+1
wt+1
around ht ,wt and rearranging, we obtain the analog of
Eq. (7) under uncertainty:
Et [∆ lnht+1] =−ε lnβ (1+ rt+1)+ εEt [∆ lnwt+1]− 1− ε2ε Et [∆ lnh
2
t+1]− εEt [∆ lnw2t+1]. (9)
The variance of the wage rate and the consequent variance of hours (i.e., the last two terms)
counterbalance the effect of positive wage growth on the hours profile. If the variance increases
late in the life cycle, then hours may fall even if the wage rate does not. However, it is obvious
that such variance should increase substantially. To illustrate, we solve Eq. (9) for Et [∆ lnh2t+1]
after replacing the left-hand side with ∆ lnht+1 and recover the implied series of the variance of the
growth rate of hours under the same calibrated parameters.15 Given the variance of wages, such
variance in the series for hours growth allows the model to perfectly replicate the PSID trend. This
series is illustrated in Figure 18. Even ignoring the fact that the model actually requires negative
variance of the growth rate of hours over most of the early part of the life cycle,16, it needs the
variance to grow sharply after age 50 to induce the observed fall in hours. The benchmark model
with uncertainty, therefore, raises the question of why the variance of hours (or the variance of
wages, or both) increase sharply after this age. Figure 18 implies an implausible degree of non-
stationarity late in the life cycle. Notice that this conclusion does not depend on the assumption of
intratemporal separability between consumption and leisure. Such an assumption, as Low (2005)
makes clear, has consequences for the shape of the consumption profile, which is not the focus of
this paper.
15Via the formula Vt [∆ lnht+1] = Et [∆ lnh2t+1]−Et [∆ lnht+1]2.
16The reason is that the benchmark model without uncertainty reproduces the trend in hours reasonably well until
age 50. With uncertainty, the variance of the wage profile reduces hours growth. Therefore, one would need negative
variance of hours to keep hours growing at the rate they would grow without uncertainty.
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Figure 18: Implied variance of the hours growth rate
4.2 Borrowing constraints
Erosa et al. (2011) are able to replicate the fall in hours worked in the PSID by calibrating a model
with both uncertainty and a borrowing constraint. The constraint takes the form of a zero lower
bound on assets. Workers engage in precautionary savings and work more when young (more than
in Low (2005), where there is no borrowing constraint) even if their future wage rate will be higher.
Later in the life cycle, the stock of assets is so large that even small negative wage shocks induce
workers to retire. Since the time period in their model is a third of a year, retirement generates
a decline in hours on a one-year basis. Notice that this explanation relies on an active extensive
margin. In particular, the argument implies that a declining hours profile of workers is an artifact
of staggered abrupt retirement, in the sense discussed at the end of section 3.1. However, we have
documented there that this is not the case in the PSID: pre-retirement transitions to fewer hours are
an important phenomenon, empirically.
It is nonetheless of interest to understand whether a borrowing constraint improves the empiri-
cal performance of the benchmark model along the intensive margin of labor supply. To isolate the
role of such a constraint, we assume that there is no uncertainty. Adding inequality at+1 ≥ 0 to the
constraint set and denoting by µt the associated multiplier, the Euler equation becomes:
λt = β (1+ rt+1)λt+1+µt , (10)
meaning that when the borrowing constraint is binding (µt > 0) a worker cannot smooth consump-
tion, so λt > β (1+rt+1)λt+1 and consumption at time t is lower than it would have been otherwise.
The dynamics of hours is now given by:
ht+1
ht
=
[
1− µtλt
β (1+ rt+1)
wt+1
wt
]ε
. (11)
That is, hours grow at a slower (possibly negative) rate when the borrowing constraint is bind-
ing, and at the same rate as in the basic model when it is not. This may sound counterintuitive:
we expect an individual for whom the borrowing constraint is active—i.e., for whom the marginal
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utility of consumption is higher than in the unconstrained case and so an extra hour of work is
more valuable—to work more. However, this is a statement about growth rates, not levels. A
borrowing-constrained worker does, in fact, work more hours in the model when the constraint is
binding compared to when it’s not. As a consequence, the hours growth rate is defined relative
to a higher level and so is lower. From Eq. (11) we can back-out the series of µtλt that allows the
model to reproduce the data. This is illustrated in Figure 19. Not surprisingly, we incur in the same
difficulty as in the previous case of uncertainty. The µt/λt ratio is required to be negative during
most of the early part of the life cycle—which of course cannot be. Furthermore, to explain the
hours decline along the intensive margin through this channel we would need a binding borrowing
constraint after age 55. This is unlikely given the empirical fact that after that age workers dissave.
The model of Erosa et al. (2011), in fact, reproduces the fall in hours per worker worse than the
fall in hours per person.
Figure 19: Implied µtλt
4.3 On-the-job training
A falling hours profile can be generated out of a non-declining wage profile in the benchmark
model if wages depend on past labor supply. This is what happens in the presence of accumulation
of human capital via on-the-job training: in this case it is by working that an individual obtains
wage growth over the life cycle. Such a mechanism breaks the tracking between hours and wages
because it is no longer true that young workers want to work less than older workers in response to
their initially low wages. However, the extent of the fall in hours late in the working life depends
on how fast the effect of current hours of work on future earnings (that is, the return to on-the-job
training) declines. To illustrate, assume that the current wage rate depends on past labor supply:
wt = wt(ht−1), where ht−1 = {h}t−1j=0 .
As illustrated by Keane (2011), the consequence is that the opportunity cost of time increases.
The increase is equal to the present value of the cumulative effect of current labor supply on all
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future wage rates. To see this, notice that now the first-order condition for hours is no longer
h
1
ε
t = v′(ct)wt , but:
h
1
ε
t = v
′(ct)wt+
T
∑
j=t+1
β j−tv′(c j)h j
∂w j
∂ht
, (12)
where the second term on the right-hand side is the present value of the lifetime increase in earnings
caused by an extra hour of work at time t. Eq. (6) becomes:
ht+1
ht
=
[
1
β (1+ rt+1)
w˜t+1
w˜t
]ε
, (13)
where
w˜t = wt+
T
∑
j=t+1
1
∏ jk=t+1(1+ rk)
h j
∂w j
∂ht
. (14)
It is clear from these expressions that hours decline, even if the current wage rate does not, if
the full opportunity cost of time w˜t declines fast enough. We can infer from the data the growth
rate of w˜t that makes this variant of the model consistent with the empirical hours trend. The
series is illustrated in Figure 20. Given that the wage profile is essentially flat after age 50, this
variant of the benchmark model implies that in order to reproduce the data, the marginal return
from on-the-job training (i.e., w˜t −wt) should decline by about 7% per year from age 52 to age
64. This number matches remarkably well the estimate of the decline in the rate of return provided
by Kuruscu (2006). In that paper, the cumulative decline in the marginal return from on-the-job
training between 30 and 45 years of experience (age 53 and 68 in our paper) is about 6% per year
(see Figure 5 in Kuruscu (2006)).
Figure 20: Implied growth rate of full opportunity cost of time (OCT)
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4.4 Increasing disutility of work/utility of leisure
Finally, predicted hours may fall in the benchmark model if we allow the disutility of labor/value
of leisure to increase after age 50. If γ is not constant, then Eq. (6) becomes:
ht+1
ht
=
[
1
β (1+ rt+1)
wt+1
wt
γt
γt+1
]ε
. (15)
Clearly, if γt increases sufficiently fast after age 50 then hours fall even if wages are growing.
For instance, when analyzing wage and hours profiles in the March CPS between 1977 and 1989
and finding shapes in line with those we report in Figure 12 and Figure 14, Card (1994) comments:
“The life-cycle profiles of wages and hours are far from parallel. Of course this does not refute the
life-cycle model, because tastes may vary systematically with age” (p. 56). Like before, we can
ask how the taste parameter γ evolve in this model to reproduce the trend of the observed hours
profile (i.e., back out the implied γt profile). The result is illustrated in Figure 21, using the log
scale. This picture reveals an interesting pattern. γt increases until the mid 30s (by about 30% at
the local maximum at age 35), then declines throughout one’s 40s (by more than 60%, relative to
the peak at 35, at the minimum, at age 51), and then picks-up very quickly. That is, the disutility
of working (or the value of alternatives to market work, or both) increases during the early years in
the labor market, declines during the second half of prime age, and then increases fast. For junior
workers, this may reflect adaptation and careers; for prime-age workers, work habits; for seniors,
instead, factors such as health deterioration, stress, or a desire to work less and devote time to other
activities may play an important role.
Figure 21: γt index
Health, however, explains little of the discrepancy between the actual and simulated profiles.
Table 3 reports the results from a fixed-effects regression of hours on a quartic polynomial in
age and the “disabled” dummy described in Section 3. The regression reveals that deteriorating
health (as captured by this variable) induces a decline of only about 100 hours—less than 20% of
the discrepancy between the data and the model at age 64 in cohort 23. Although this particular
longitudinal measure of disability in the PSID may be a poor proxy for health conditions, the data
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suggest that an increase in the marginal disutility of labor via health deterioration alone is unlikely
to explain the fall in hours after age 50. This is consistent with French (2005), who concludes that
“health status alone must have a small causal role in the decline in the number of hours worked by
workers near retirement.” (p. 410)
Table 3: Effect of disability on hours of workers
1 2
hours hours
disabled -98.2* -102.1*
(23.8) (6.4)
age 384.1* -13.8
(104.4) (10.7)
age2 -1509.2* 141.2*
(391.4) (38.1)
age3 265.3* -21.0*
(63.1) (5.7)
age4 -17.3* 0.36
(3.7) (0.31)
Const. -1773.5 1570.9*
(1007.0) (106.5)
Cohort 23 years old all
Observations 9427 143,156
Individuals 510 15,016
Notes: The table contains the results from a regression of hours on a fourth-degree polynomial in age and variable
disabled. This is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a person responded “yes” to the question “Do you have any
physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount of work that you can do?”, and 0 otherwise.
Only individuals reporting strictly positive hours and included in the regression. Standard errors in parenthesis. An
asterisk denotes significance at the 1% confidence level or better
Another possibility is that the value of alternatives to market work increases during the pre-
retirement years. For instance, in a companion paper to this one (Rupert and Zanella (2010))
we show that, with unchanging preferences over the life cycle, grandparenting goes a long way
towards reconciling falling hours and non-declining wages. The reason is that the appearance of
grandchildren increases the value of “leisure” during the preretirement years. It is interesting to
note that in Figure 21 the value of alternatives to market work increases in those stages of the
life cycle when there are young children in the household or the family. This endogenous process
is observationally equivalent, in the benchmark model, to an exogenous increase in γt late in the
life cycle. This example indicates how the evidence documented in this paper restricts quantitative
macroeconomic models. Except for the dependence of γ on age and the wage schedule, this variant
of the model is the discrete-time version of Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). They assume that the
wage profile is hump-shaped. Their results can be obtained with a concave, non-declining wage
profile and a J-shaped profile for the value of leisure similar to the one in Figure 21. Our results
indicate that the latter is likely a better assumption.
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5 Conclusions
We have documented that life-cycle wage profiles derived from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics show no tendency to decline until late into one’s 60’s. In contrast, hours begin to fall after
age 50, as do earnings. These results challenge a common assumption in macroeconomic models,
that the wage profile is hump-shaped and that it is its decline late in the working life that induces
a reduction of labor supply along the intensive margin. A benchmark life cycle model is unable
to replicate this pattern. The model and the data can be reconciled by departing from such bench-
mark. The mere presence of uncertainty and borrowing constraints seem unable, by themselves, to
do so. However, we have shown that the life cycle model is able to replicate the empirical pattern
under two circumstances, in particular. First, the benefits of accumulating human capital via on-
the-job training are an important component of the opportunity cost of time and decline relatively
fast after age 50—in line with previous empirical research. Second, the value of alternatives to
work for pay increase fast after that same age. Research about this channel is more scant. While
deteriorating health plays a role, it seems unlikely that it plays a decisive role. The possible desire
by part of older workers to allocate more time to activities different from work for pay—perhaps
because new “goods” become available—seems a promising direction for future research.
6 Appendix
In this appendix we report tables containing the numerical life cycle profiles illustrated in the paper,
for the eight cohorts we have analyzed and for the whole sample. That is, the profiles illustrated in
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7. Numerical profiles by gender and education and available from
the authors upon request.
We report both the raw profiles and the profiles smoothed using a fractional polynomial fit
(degree 2 for wages and earnings, degree 4 for hours). The initial value normalized to 1 for cohort
23. For older cohorts, the initial value is normalized to the corresponding value, at that same age,
of cohort 23. This way growth rates can be compared across cohorts. Furthermore, the initial
smoothed value is set equal to the initial raw value. This way growth rates can be better compared
across the raw and smoothed series as well.
Notice that average earnings are not equal, of course, to the product of average wages and
average hours. Researchers interested in using the latter measure in particular applications should
compute it out of the wage and hours tables.
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Table 4: Wage profiles, PSID, cohorts 23–38
Cohort 23 Cohort 28 Cohort 33 Cohort 38
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
23 1.000 1.000
24 1.074 1.109
25 1.157 1.153
26 1.225 1.191
27 1.254 1.225
28 1.319 1.255 1.319 1.255
29 1.333 1.282 1.329 1.279
30 1.329 1.306 1.364 1.300
31 1.310 1.327 1.381 1.320
32 1.397 1.347 1.392 1.337
33 1.411 1.365 1.423 1.354 1.411 1.365
34 1.433 1.381 1.442 1.369 1.422 1.376
35 1.404 1.395 1.438 1.383 1.458 1.388
36 1.328 1.408 1.402 1.396 1.477 1.400
37 1.397 1.421 1.466 1.408 1.488 1.411
38 1.348 1.432 1.472 1.420 1.522 1.423 1.348 1.432
39 1.387 1.442 1.486 1.430 1.542 1.435 1.358 1.464
40 1.412 1.452 1.460 1.440 1.537 1.447 1.393 1.493
41 1.386 1.460 1.388 1.450 1.500 1.459 1.411 1.518
42 1.424 1.468 1.375 1.459 1.568 1.470 1.422 1.539
43 1.497 1.476 1.363 1.468 1.575 1.481 1.453 1.558
44 1.459 1.483 1.384 1.476 1.589 1.492 1.473 1.574
45 1.434 1.489 1.382 1.484 1.561 1.503 1.469 1.588
46 1.429 1.495 1.396 1.491 1.485 1.514 1.432 1.600
47 1.509 1.501 1.439 1.499 1.471 1.524 1.497 1.611
48 1.540 1.506 1.454 1.506 1.458 1.534 1.504 1.620
49 1.571 1.511 1.445 1.513 1.480 1.543 1.518 1.627
50 1.563 1.516 1.432 1.519 1.478 1.552 1.491 1.634
51 1.513 1.520 1.435 1.526 1.493 1.561 1.418 1.639
52 1.619 1.524 1.442 1.532 1.540 1.569 1.405 1.644
53 1.788 1.538 1.555 1.576 1.392 1.647
54 1.614 1.531 1.560 1.545 1.546 1.583 1.414 1.650
55 1.504 1.551 1.532 1.589 1.411 1.653
56 1.592 1.538 1.465 1.557 1.535 1.594 1.426 1.654
57 1.504 1.563 1.542 1.599 1.471 1.655
58 1.501 1.544 1.912 1.603 1.486 1.656
59 1.535 1.574 1.669 1.605 1.477 1.657
60 1.503 1.549 1.609 1.607 1.463 1.657
61 1.579 1.586 1.567 1.608 1.466 1.656
62 1.621 1.554 1.608 1.608 1.473 1.656
63 1.564 1.598 1.826 1.655
64 1.503 1.558 1.642 1.604 1.594 1.654
65 1.563 1.610 1.537 1.652
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Table 5: Wage profiles, PSID, cohorts 43–58
Cohort 43 Cohort 48 Cohort 53 Cohort 58
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
43 1.497 1.476
44 1.505 1.546
45 1.610 1.602
46 1.694 1.647
47 1.670 1.681
48 1.726 1.706 1.540 1.506
49 1.701 1.723 1.541 1.571
50 1.737 1.733 1.583 1.626
51 1.711 1.738 1.666 1.670
52 1.790 1.737 1.727 1.704
53 1.771 1.731 1.682 1.729 1.599 1.502
54 1.772 1.721 1.727 1.746 1.614 1.531
55 1.723 1.708 1.705 1.755 1.615 1.557
56 1.679 1.692 1.732 1.757 1.701 1.580
57 1.635 1.673 1.794 1.751 1.684 1.600
58 1.580 1.652 1.819 1.739 1.778 1.618 1.501 1.544
59 1.655 1.629 1.765 1.720 1.809 1.635 1.420 1.495
60 1.543 1.605 1.728 1.696 1.681 1.649 1.438 1.465
61 1.523 1.579 1.646 1.667 1.662 1.662 1.402 1.455
62 1.691 1.551 1.577 1.632 1.776 1.673 1.447 1.466
63 1.566 1.523 1.424 1.592 1.777 1.683 1.423 1.498
64 1.558 1.494 1.465 1.548 1.893 1.691 1.492 1.554
65 1.390 1.464 1.654 1.499 1.761 1.699 1.592 1.634
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Table 6: Earnings profiles, PSID, cohorts 23–38
Cohort 23 Cohort 28 Cohort 33 Cohort 38
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
23 1.000 1.000
24 1.122 1.175
25 1.188 1.204
26 1.217 1.233
27 1.294 1.262
28 1.412 1.291 1.412 1.291
29 1.445 1.320 1.393 1.308
30 1.446 1.348 1.486 1.324
31 1.370 1.376 1.514 1.340
32 1.461 1.404 1.521 1.356
33 1.480 1.430 1.610 1.372 1.480 1.430
34 1.538 1.456 1.645 1.387 1.468 1.446
35 1.489 1.481 1.623 1.402 1.483 1.462
36 1.451 1.506 1.523 1.417 1.475 1.476
37 1.476 1.529 1.619 1.430 1.587 1.491
38 1.453 1.551 1.670 1.443 1.663 1.504 1.453 1.551
39 1.513 1.572 1.641 1.456 1.689 1.516 1.479 1.582
40 1.558 1.591 1.604 1.467 1.625 1.528 1.503 1.611
41 1.510 1.609 1.549 1.477 1.488 1.538 1.454 1.639
42 1.592 1.626 1.520 1.486 1.558 1.547 1.521 1.664
43 1.696 1.641 1.508 1.494 1.574 1.555 1.645 1.687
44 1.635 1.654 1.586 1.501 1.600 1.561 1.659 1.707
45 1.631 1.666 1.628 1.506 1.553 1.566 1.548 1.725
46 1.608 1.676 1.626 1.510 1.506 1.569 1.544 1.739
47 1.653 1.684 1.697 1.512 1.547 1.571 1.546 1.750
48 1.676 1.688 1.669 1.512 1.544 1.570 1.625 1.758
49 1.700 1.693 1.718 1.510 1.495 1.567 1.723 1.762
50 1.714 1.694 1.626 1.506 1.511 1.562 1.707 1.761
51 1.706 1.693 1.618 1.500 1.550 1.555 1.551 1.757
52 1.700 1.690 1.608 1.492 1.587 1.545 1.529 1.748
53 1.709 1.481 1.592 1.533 1.522 1.734
54 1.810 1.676 1.657 1.468 1.642 1.518 1.486 1.715
55 1.614 1.452 1.576 1.501 1.556 1.691
56 1.713 1.651 1.644 1.433 1.611 1.480 1.508 1.661
57 1.662 1.412 1.443 1.456 1.542 1.625
58 1.617 1.614 1.688 1.429 1.604 1.583
59 1.664 1.359 1.514 1.398 1.538 1.535
60 1.562 1.565 1.511 1.364 1.442 1.480
61 1.579 1.294 1.451 1.326 1.300 1.418
62 1.582 1.503 1.158 1.285 1.250 1.348
63 1.285 1.214 1.170 1.271
64 1.297 1.427 1.045 1.190 0.962 1.187
65 1.051 1.119 1.022 1.094
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Table 7: Earnings profiles, PSID, cohorts 43–58
Cohort 43 Cohort 48 Cohort 53 Cohort 58
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
43 1.696 1.641
44 1.720 1.675
45 1.839 1.706
46 1.890 1.732
47 1.884 1.754
48 1.914 1.771 1.676 1.688
49 1.878 1.783 1.675 1.755
50 1.845 1.789 1.687 1.807
51 1.817 1.789 1.735 1.844
52 1.899 1.782 1.773 1.869
53 1.871 1.769 1.751 1.880 1.795 1.646
54 1.889 1.749 1.847 1.879 1.810 1.676
55 1.834 1.722 1.787 1.867 1.784 1.696
56 1.729 1.686 1.715 1.844 1.869 1.706
57 1.721 1.643 1.832 1.810 1.799 1.706
58 1.560 1.590 1.828 1.766 1.867 1.694 1.617 1.614
59 1.654 1.529 1.706 1.712 1.839 1.670 1.587 1.540
60 1.554 1.459 1.546 1.649 1.647 1.634 1.442 1.467
61 1.511 1.378 1.488 1.577 1.689 1.584 1.411 1.395
62 1.403 1.287 1.326 1.496 1.730 1.521 1.348 1.323
63 1.272 1.186 1.191 1.408 1.558 1.444 1.291 1.251
64 1.172 1.073 1.264 1.311 1.497 1.351 1.134 1.181
65 0.918 0.949 1.294 1.207 1.288 1.243 1.145 1.112
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Table 8: Hours profiles, PSID, cohorts 23–38
Cohort 23 Cohort 28 Cohort 33 Cohort 38
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
23 1.000 1.000
24 1.017 1.009
25 1.027 1.016
26 0.984 1.022
27 1.010 1.027
28 1.042 1.031 1.042 1.031
29 1.070 1.034 0.972 1.019
30 1.053 1.037 0.967 1.008
31 1.008 1.038 0.978 0.998
32 1.033 1.040 0.974 0.990
33 1.027 1.042 0.991 0.983 1.027 1.042
34 1.043 1.043 0.985 0.977 0.968 1.052
35 1.031 1.045 0.955 0.973 0.980 1.056
36 1.063 1.047 0.920 0.970 0.982 1.055
37 1.042 1.049 0.945 0.968 1.008 1.051
38 1.051 1.052 0.972 0.966 1.016 1.044 1.051 1.052
39 1.044 1.055 0.942 0.966 1.038 1.037 1.031 1.036
40 1.065 1.058 0.947 0.967 0.979 1.029 0.989 1.022
41 1.057 1.062 0.975 0.969 0.951 1.022 0.964 1.011
42 1.066 1.066 0.938 0.971 0.952 1.015 0.972 1.002
43 1.098 1.071 0.933 0.974 0.962 1.010 0.997 0.996
44 1.078 1.076 0.965 0.977 0.970 1.006 0.994 0.991
45 1.101 1.081 0.962 0.980 0.948 1.003 0.983 0.988
46 1.087 1.086 0.970 0.983 0.970 1.002 0.960 0.987
47 1.067 1.091 0.962 0.986 0.963 1.002 0.964 0.987
48 1.067 1.095 0.992 0.989 0.928 1.003 1.000 0.989
49 1.067 1.099 0.995 0.991 0.918 1.005 0.996 0.991
50 1.091 1.102 0.969 0.993 0.954 1.007 0.992 0.993
51 1.112 1.103 0.969 0.993 0.956 1.010 0.957 0.995
52 1.076 1.103 0.948 0.992 0.970 1.011 0.986 0.996
53 0.958 0.990 0.975 1.012 0.963 0.996
54 1.125 1.096 0.977 0.986 0.983 1.010 0.967 0.994
55 0.973 0.981 0.968 1.006 0.974 0.990
56 1.076 1.078 0.950 0.973 0.972 0.999 0.931 0.983
57 0.937 0.962 0.927 0.988 0.967 0.972
58 1.046 1.044 0.947 0.972 0.965 0.956
59 0.977 0.932 0.887 0.950 0.932 0.935
60 0.987 0.990 0.867 0.922 0.906 0.908
61 0.840 0.889 0.839 0.886 0.837 0.874
62 0.915 0.909 0.774 0.841 0.868 0.831
63 0.795 0.829 0.759 0.780
64 0.789 0.797 0.710 0.723 0.655 0.718
65 0.749 0.749 0.661 0.645
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Table 9: Hours profiles, PSID, cohorts 43–58
Cohort 43 Cohort 48 Cohort 53 Cohort 58
Age Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth Raw Smooth
43 1.098 1.071
44 1.090 1.094
45 1.106 1.096
46 1.093 1.085
47 1.113 1.068
48 1.069 1.051 1.067 0.000
49 1.048 1.035 1.047 0.000
50 1.039 1.022 1.031 1.095
51 1.015 1.013 1.029 1.060
52 1.012 1.007 1.000 1.044
53 0.998 1.003 1.036 1.050 1.143 1.117
54 1.032 1.001 1.047 1.053 1.125 1.096
55 1.021 0.998 1.028 1.052 1.100 1.083
56 0.995 0.994 0.989 1.044 1.110 1.074
57 1.017 0.987 1.023 1.029 1.084 1.066
58 0.970 0.975 1.006 1.006 1.082 1.057 1.046 1.044
59 0.985 0.958 0.975 0.976 1.086 1.043 1.020 1.002
60 0.953 0.932 0.896 0.941 1.021 1.022 0.967 0.973
61 0.945 0.898 0.894 0.903 1.015 0.991 0.935 0.938
62 0.821 0.854 0.852 0.867 0.986 0.946 0.911 0.889
63 0.799 0.798 0.807 0.835 0.897 0.887 0.827 0.827
64 0.746 0.731 0.807 0.815 0.829 0.809 0.759 0.759
65 0.667 0.650 0.798 0.813 0.727 0.710 0.712 0.706
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